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A n important problem for decision-makers in society deals with the efficient and equitable allocation ofscarce resources to individuals and groups. The significance of this problem is rapidly growing since there is
a rising demand for scarce resources all over the world. Such resource dilemmas belong to a conceptually broader
class of situations known as social dilemmas. In this type of dilemma, individual choices that appear ‘‘rational’’
often result in suboptimal group outcomes. In this article we study how people make monetary allocation
decisions between the community where they live and a neighbouring community, with the aim of finding out to
what extent these decisions are subject to biased over-weighting. The manuscript reports four experiments that
deal with the way individuals make such allocation decisions when the potential beneficiaries are such
communities. The specific goal of these experiments is to gauge the amount of bias in the weights that people
assign to the various beneficiaries. Taken together, the results from all the four experiments suggest that making
the gain of the neighbouring community prominent to a higher extent de-biases the outcomes (the prominence
effect) compared to when own community gain is made prominent. Place identity is discussed as a potentially
important factor in this connection. Hence, it may be argued that there seems to be some kind of a pro-self
component that is able to explain a large part of the variance observed for the prominence effect. Connections
between such a factor and in-group favouritism are discussed. A strength of the study was that these major results
appeared to be quite robust when considered as task effects, as the salience of the manipulated context factors in
the studies (in terms of reliable main or interaction effects) did not distort them.
U n proble`me important pour les de´cideurs dans la socie´te´ concerne la re´partition efficace et e´quitable desrares ressources disponibles pour les individus et les groupes. L’ampleur de ce proble`me se de´veloppe
rapidement depuis qu’il y a une demande croissante pour le petit nombre de ressources tout autour du monde. De
tels dilemmes de ressources appartiennent a` une classe conceptuellement plus large de situations connues comme
les dilemmes sociaux. Dans ce type de dilemmes, les choix individuels qui apparaissent «rationnels» re´sultent
souvent en des conse´quences de groupe sous-optimales. Dans cet article, nous e´tudions comment les gens
prennent des de´cisions de re´partition mone´taire entre la communaute´ ou` ils vivent et la communaute´ voisine. Le
but est de faire ressortir dans quelles mesures ces de´cisions sont sujettes a` un biais de surpoids. Le manuscrit
rapporte quatre expe´riences se re´fe´rant a` la fac¸on dont les individus prennent de telles de´cisions de re´partition
quand les be´ne´ficiaires potentiels sont de ces communaute´s. Le but spe´cifique de ces expe´riences est de mesurer la
quantite´ de biais dans le poids accorde´ par les gens aux divers be´ne´ficiaires. Dans l’ensemble, les re´sultats des
quatre expe´riences sugge`rent que le fait de mettre a` l’avant-plan le profit de la communaute´ voisine re´duit en
grande partie les biais dans les conse´quences (effet de saillance) comparativement a` lorsque le profit de sa propre
communaute´ est mis a` l’avant-plan. L’identite´ du lieu est discute´e comme facteur potentiellement important dans
ce lien. A` partir de la`, il peut eˆtre avance´ qu’il semble y avoir une sorte de composante de favoritisme envers soi-
meˆme qui pourrait expliquer une grande partie de la variance observe´e pour l’effet de saillance. Les liens entre ce
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facteur et le favoritisme envers l’endogroupe sont discute´s. Une force de l’e´tude e´tait que ces principaux re´sultats
se montrent plutoˆt robustes lorsque conside´re´s comme effets de la taˆche, alors que la saillance des facteurs
contextuels qui furent manipule´s dans les e´tudes (en termes d’effets principaux ou d’interaction fiables) ne les a
pas alte´re´s.
U n problema importante para los decididores en la sociedad trata con la asignacio´n eficiente y equitativa delos escasos recursos a individuos y a grupos. La importancia de este problema crece ra´pidamente debido a
la creciente demanda de los escasos recursos en todo el mundo. Tales dilemas de asignacio´n de recursos
pertenecen a una clase de situaciones conceptualmente ma´s amplia conocida como dilemas sociales. En este tipo
de dilemas, las opciones individuales que parecen ‘‘racionales’’ a menudo resultan en desenlaces grupales
subo´ptimos. Este artı´culo estudia co´mo la gente toma decisiones sobre asignaciones monetarias entre la
comunidad en la que viven y una comunidad vecina, con el propo´sito de determinar en que´ medida estas
decisiones esta´n sujetas a sesgo. El manuscrito presenta cuatro experimentos que se refieren a la forma en que los
individuos toman tales desiciones sobre asignacio´n de recursos cuando los beneficiarios potenciales son esas
comunidades. La meta especı´fica de estos experimentos es calcular la cantidad de sesgo en el peso que la gente
asigna a varios beneficiarios. En conjunto, los resultados de los cuatro experimentos sugieren que al hacer
prominente la ganancia de la comunidad vecina reduce en mayor medida el sesgo en los resultados (efecto de
prominencia) comparado con que la ganancia de la propia comunidad sea la que se haga prominente. La
identidad de lugar se discute como un factor potencialmente importante a este respecto. Por lo tanto, podrı´a
alegarse que parece haber algu´n tipo de componente en favor de sı´ mismo que podrı´a explicar gran parte de la
varianza observada para el efecto de prominencia. Se discuten las conexiones entre tal factor y el favoritismo
intra grupo. Una fortaleza de este estudio es que estos resultados principales son al parecer bastante robustos,
considerados como efectos de la tarea, pues la prominencia de los factores contextuales manipulados en los
estudios (en te´rminos de efectos principales o de interaccio´n fiables) no los distorsionaron.
An important problem for decision-makers in
society deals with the efficient and equitable
allocation of scarce resources to individuals and
groups (Leventhal, 1976; Samuelson, 1993). The
significance of this problem is rapidly growing
since there is a rising demand for scarce resources
all over the world. This fact was pinpointed in
Hardin’s (1968) classic article entitled The tragedy
of the commons, in which he suggested that there is
a dilemma inherent in the management and
organization of common pool natural resources
(see also Messick & Brewer, 1983).
Such resource dilemmas, where people choose
between acting selfishly or collectively, belong
to a conceptually broader class of situations
known as social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980). A social
dilemma incorporates the following two features:
(a) each group member has an individual incentive
to make a self-interested choice since the
monetary payoff to each individual is higher for
such a choice, regardless of the others’ choices; (b)
when all members make these ‘‘rational’’ choices,
the collective outcome is worse than if all
members had made cooperative choices favouring
the group interest. Thus, the monetary payoff for
all individuals in the group is higher if all
cooperate than if all defect (Messick & Brewer,
1983). In this vein, individual choices that appear
‘‘rational’’ often result in suboptimal group
outcomes.
This article focuses on how people make
monetary allocation decisions between the com-
munity where they live and a neighbouring
community. The aim is to find out to what extent
these decisions are subject to biased over-weight-
ing. A major result of the study is that biased over-
weighting plays an important role in resource
allocation decisions, but that it operates differently
depending on whether a ‘‘pro-self’’ or a ‘‘pro-
other’’ dimension is manipulated.
THE ROLE OF PRO-SELF AND PRO-OTHER
IN PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION
According to previous research, the most impor-
tant attribute of a decision situation generally
looms larger in a variety of preference tasks than
in a calibrating procedure (e.g., a matching task)
(Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Montgomery, Selart,
Ga¨rling, & Lindberg, 1994; Selart, 1996; Selart,
Boe, & Ga¨rling, 1999; Selart, Ga¨rling, &
Montgomery, 1998; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic,
1988). Despite having made two alternatives
equally attractive through the calibrating match-
ing procedure, people, when asked to choose the
one alternative that they prefer most, do not make
random choices. Instead, research indicates that
people systematically opt for the alternative with
the highest value on the prominent attribute. This
phenomenon has been labelled the prominence
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effect, and it has been found to have a bearing on
aspects of environmental valuation (Kahneman &
Tversky, 2000). For instance, Kahneman and
Ritov (1994) showed that prominence effects
leading to preference reversals between choices
and monetary values are present in environmental
interventions.
In the present research it is assumed that these
effects may also be present in resource allocation
decisions. For instance, it could be argued that
both pro-self and pro-other could play a part in a
resource allocation task. If the maximization of
own community gain in a resource allocation task
is made salient, it would appeal to people’s in-
group social identity. People should accordingly
opt for an alternative that maximizes their own
community gain (pro-self alternative). If, on the
other hand, the maximization of neighbouring
community gain is made salient, people should opt
for an option that maximizes the joint gain of the
own community and the neighbouring one (joint
alternative). Thus, they should not opt for an
alternative that maximizes the neighbouring com-
munity gain only (pro-other alternative).
From a practical point of view, this implies that
if administrators in a region want to stimulate
cooperative behaviour in Community A, they
should highlight the needs of neighbouring
Community B, making its share of the resource
allocation the prominent attribute. This will most
probably have a de-biasing impact on the promi-
nence effect in the sense that Community A
citizens will apply more compensatory decision
strategies that allow for trade-offs to be made
between the attributes (what Community A and B
will receive).
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EQUALITY
HEURISTIC IN RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
The equality norm prescribes that a resource
should be equally allocated to all its legitimate
members (Deutsch, 1975; Sampson, 1975). This
principle is widely used in situations where
cooperation and harmony within the group are
the major goals. Resource allocation decisions
constitute such a situation in several ways. Here,
people usually make their decisions based on some
notion of the idea of equality (Messick, 1993,
1995). Recently, Roch, Lane, Samuelson, Allison,
and Dent (2000) also established that members of
groups sharing resources first anchor their con-
sumption choices on an ‘‘equal-division’’ heuristic
and then adjust their choices in a self-serving
direction. A necessary condition for this
adjustment was sufficiency of cognitive capacity.
It has been demonstrated that whether or not the
amount of a resource is (easily) divisible with the
number of share takers is a factor that in-
fluences the application of equality (Allison &
Messick, 1990). Hence, the use of the equality
heuristics may be a factor with the potential of
distorting the prominence effect in resource
allocation tasks.
THE ROLE OF IDENTITY AS A DRIVER IN
RESOURCE ALLOCATION DECISIONS
It has been observed that within- and between-
group communication has an important impact on
how people behave in resource dilemmas
(Bornstein, Rapoport, Kerpel, & Katz, 1989).
Moreover, it has been observed in resource
dilemma studies (see e.g., Brewer & Kramer,
1986; Kramer & Brewer, 1984) that group member
categorization in terms of membership in smaller
as compared to larger social units results in social
identity effects. Similarly, previous research
reveals that between-groups comparisons result
in a general tendency to evaluate one’s own
membership group (in-group) more positively
than any nonmembership group (out-group)
(Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). This tendency
is generally referred to as in-group favouritism or
in-group bias (Brewer, 1999, 2001; Otten &
Mummendey, 2000). It is argued that in-group
social identity may be the major reason as to why
people in some resource allocation contexts tend to
favour their own community over a neighbouring
community.
Recently, there has also been a debate on
whether core concepts in environmental psychol-
ogy such as, for instance, place identity may play a
role in resource dilemmas (e.g., Bonaiuto, Carrus,
Martorella, & Bonnes, 2002; Fried, 2000; Giuliani,
2002). In this research, the concept of place
identity is used to encompass both social and
physical environments. It has, for instance, been
revealed that the notion of place, in people’s
general opinion, to a great extent refers to any
combination of regional communities (Cuba &
Hummon, 1993). Therefore, it is argued that there
is some evidence supporting the idea that the
driving force behind joint community gain may be
derived from place identity. The concept of ‘‘place
identity’’ may therefore be interpreted as a special
form of social identity in which both social and
physical dimensions play a part. The circle of what
is to be defined as the in-group may thus be
widened (see Cuba & Hummon, 1993).
PROMINENCE EFFECT: A PRO-SELF COMPONENT? 431
HYPOTHESES
Four experimental studies investigating whether or
not the prominence effect is present in resource
allocation decisions are reported. Generally, it is
assumed that the prominence effect will be present
in these types of decisions given that it has been
proved to be present for more purely individualis-
tic choices. It is also assumed that the effect will
depend on whether a ‘‘pro-self’’ or a ‘‘pro-other’’
dimension is looming largest.
The following two hypotheses are tested in the
present research:
N H1a. A prominence effect will be found in
resource allocation decisions such that partici-
pants will prefer a matched alternative that
maximizes the own gain when ‘‘own community
gain’’ is manipulated to be the prominent
attribute.
The reason underlying this hypothesis is that the
prominence effect generally is assumed to be
favoured by prominent ‘‘self-interest attributes’’
and not by prominent ‘‘other-interest attributes’’.
On the contrary, it is not assumed that
participants will prefer a pro-other alternative that
maximizes neighbouring community gain (altru-
ism) when ‘‘neighbouring community gain’’ is
made the prominent attribute. It is therefore
hypothesized that:
N H1b. Participants will prefer an alternative that
maximizes the joint gain of the own community
and a neighbouring community when neigh-
bouring community gain is made the prominent
attribute.
STUDY 1
H1a was tested in Study 1. Thus, it was assumed
that participants systematically should opt for the
alternative that maximizes own community gain,
when this attribute is made salient, even though
that alternative has been matched by other
participants to be equally attractive as a competing
alternative that maximizes joint gain (own +
neighbouring community gain). In order to under-
stand the influence of framing factors on the
prominence effect, attribute range was also
manipulated. Still, this factor was not expected
to distort the prominence effect.
Attribute range effects constitute an important
class of framing effects that imply context manip-
ulation. They have been proved to have an impact
on judgment and decision-making tasks. As an
example, it has been revealed that decision weights
shift as a function of variance (Meyer & Eagle,
1982); attributes with greater variance receive
more weights. Goldstein (1990) and Selart (1996)
have also revealed that ratings of attribute
importance and preferences are a function of
attribute ranges. On the other hand, there are
studies showing that decision weights do not
depend on the variation of scores (Beattie &
Baron, 1991). However, in Study 1 it was assumed
that the introduction of a framing manipulation of
the type described would not affect the promi-
nence effect. The reason is that context effects
generally are considered to be less influential than
task effects (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).
The introduction of the factor may therefore be
regarded as a way of testing the robustness of the
model. Hence, it provides for a sensitivity test of
the hypotheses, which is standard procedure in
decision analysis.
Method
Participants. Seventy-two undergraduate stu-
dents (36 men and 36 women) at Go¨teborg
University participated in the study and were
paid SEK 50 (approximately US$5.5) for
their participation. Participants predominantly
lived in the Greater Go¨teborg area, Sweden.
Half of them were undergraduates in psychology
and the other half were undergraduates in
economics.
Experimental design. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the conditions of a 3
(response procedure: choice, preference rating,
rank ordering)62 (alternative: own community
vs joint community)62 (attribute range: wide vs
narrow) factorial design, where gender and type of
student population were balanced.
Participants were initially instructed to indicate
their preferences for resource allocation alterna-
tives in 16 tasks. The order of the tasks was
counterbalanced. Based on a real-life initiative
that took place in Swedish politics in the mid 1990s
(the so-called ‘‘Persson plan,’’ named after Prime
Minister Go¨ran Persson), each decision task was
described by the following two attributes: (1) how
much money the own community received in
financial support for environmental protection
from the government, and (2) how much money
a neighbouring community received from the
government for the same purpose (see also
Kemp, 1998, 2003; Kemp & Burt, 2001; Kemp &
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Willetts, 1995, for reviews of people’s valuation of
government-funded services).
In all tasks, own community gain was manipu-
lated as the prominent attribute. Thus, partici-
pants were informed that the own community
deserved priority over the neighbouring commu-
nity due to either need or performance, respec-
tively, in the two conditions.
Building on the previous introduction of
attribute range effects as potential threats to the
hypotheses, two different versions of attribute
range were introduced. In one condition, the
range between the attribute levels of the pro-
minent attribute was narrow, and for the other
it was wide. In the narrow condition, the
differences between the attribute levels were hence
very low, whereas they were high in the wide
condition.
Response procedure. Study 1 also manipulated
response procedure on three levels; choice, pre-
ference ratings, and rank orders. This factor was
treated as a measure of control since previous
research has revealed that elicitation form has
practically no effect on the prominence effect
(Selart, 1996). Response mode was manipulated
between subjects.
Four alternative allocations were consistently
applied: own community gain maximized the
individual gain; joint community gain maximized
the common gain of self and other; equality
allocated the resource equally between self and
other; and pro-other maximized the gain of the
other. Prior to this study, two of the allocations
(own community gain and joint community gain)
had, in another study, using other undergraduates
as participants, been matched to appear equally
attractive. In this matching study, one missing
attribute level was to be filled in by the participant
(see Tversky et al., 1988). The participants’ task
was to provide the missing value so that they
perceived the options to be as equally attractive.
They were informed that the value provided had to
be higher (lower) than the value of the other
option on the same attribute. In this way the
constructed options that were based on the
matching experiments provided some form of
normative benchmark. A control group was
therefore unnecessary.
The remaining two allocations (equality and
pro-other) were constructed on the basis of the
matched data, that is, they were constructed in
such a way that the sum of the objective attribute
levels was systematically set at on the same average
level.
A score of 1 was assigned to the alternative that
was chosen, given the highest rating, or rank
ordered as the most attractive in the different
response procedures, respectively. The remaining
three alternatives were assigned a score of 0. If
more than one alternative received the same
preference rating, the score of 1 was divided
equally among the equally preferred alternatives
(e.g., a score of 0.5 was assigned to two
alternatives when they were equally preferred,
and a score of 0 to the remaining two).
Results and discussion
A 3 (response procedure: choice vs preference
ratings vs rank orders) 6 2 (alternative: own
community vs joint community gain)62 (attribute
range: wide vs narrow) mixed ANOVA with
repeated measures on the last two factors was
performed. The analyses yielded the following
effects: univariate F(2, 68) 5 0.13, p 5 .88 for
response mode; univariate F(1, 68) 5 5.03, p , .05
for alternative; univariate F(1, 68) 5 6.67, p , .05
for attribute range; univariate F(1, 68) 5 8.89,
p , .01 for the interaction between alternative and
attribute range.
H1a. As indicated by the reliable main effect for
alternative (see Figure 1 for an illustration), a
prominence effect was observed, in that the own
community alternative (the alternative with the
highest value on the prominent attribute) generally
was more frequently chosen or highly rated than
the joint community alternative (the matched
nonprominent alternative). There was also an
unexpected reliable interaction between alternative
and attribute range. This implies that attribute
range, although considered a context factor, has
an impact on the prominence effect. However, it
does not distort it.
Manipulation check. The mean weight ratio
obtained from the pilot matching-experiment
(n 5 36) was 2.18 (the difference between the
attribute levels of the nonprominent attribute
divided by the difference between the attribute
levels of the prominent attribute), indicating that
own community gain was perceived to be the
prominent attribute.
STUDY 2
To replicate the finding from Study 1, the same
experimental design was used in Study 2, except
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that another context factor was used. It was
assumed that H1a should also be supported in
Study 2. In the present study, the framing of gains
(as a pure gain or as a loss reduction) was used.
The substantial importance of framing was first
established by Tversky and Kahneman (1981),
who defined a decision frame as ‘‘the decision
maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and
contingencies associated with a particular choice.’’
They also suggested that decision frames are
partly controlled by the formulation of the
problem, and partly by the norms, habits, and
characteristics of the decision maker. In addition,
Schelling (1981) has revealed that the way in
which alternatives are framed is of great impor-
tance for the acceptance of governmental tax laws.
For instance, depending on the reference point,
tax payments may be perceived as a reduced gain
or as a loss (Chang, Nichols, & Schultz, 1987).
A refund withholding may represent a gain,
whereas a tax payment represents a loss (see
also Kuhberger, 1998, for a review of the framing
literature). However, as in Study 1, it was
assumed that the introduction of a framing
manipulation of the type described would not
have a negative impact on the prominence
effect. The reason for introducing the factor is
once again to test the robustness/sensitivity of the
model.
Method
Participants. Another 72 undergraduate stu-
dents (36 men and 36 women), drawn from the
same populations of psychology and economics
undergraduates at Go¨teborg University as in Study
1, participated in the study and were paid SEK 50
for their participation.
Experimental design. The experimental design
was the same as in Study 1, except that type
of resource description was used as the
context factor for the alternatives. In one
version, the resource was framed as ‘‘amount of
money per year and inhabitant that the community
receives from the government for environmental
protection measures.’’ In the other version, the
resource was framed as ‘‘amount of money per year
and inhabitant that the community receives from the
government for reduction of taxes related to
environmental issues.’’
Based on the balancing of gender and type
of student population, participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the six conditions of
the 3 (response procedure)62 (alternative)62
(frame; reduction vs reception) factorial design.
The same scoring procedure of participants’
responses was used as in Study 1.
Results and discussion
A 3 (response procedure: choice vs preference
ratings vs rank orders)62 (alternative: own
community vs joint community gain)62 (frame:
reduction vs reception) mixed ANOVA with
repeated measures on the last two factors
was performed. The analyses yielded the following
effects: univariate F(2, 58) 5 1.22, p 5 .30 for
response mode; univariate F(1, 58) 5 22.98,
p , .0001 for alternative; univariate F(1, 58) 5
0.68, p 5 .68 for type of frame; univariate F(1, 58)
5 4.98, p , .05 for the interaction between
alternative and type of frame.
H1a. As indicated by the reliable main effects
for alternative (see Figure 2 for an illustration), a
prominence effect was once again observed, in that
Figure 1. Mean response scores in Study 1 by alternative and control condition.
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the own community alternative generally was
more frequently chosen or highly rated than the
joint community alternative. A reliable interaction
between alternative and type of frame was also
observed, indicating that type of frame had an
impact on the prominence effect. However, it did
not distort it.
Manipulation check. The mean weight ratio
obtained from the pilot matching-experiment
(n 5 36) was 2.36, indicating that own comm-
unity gain was perceived to be the prominent
attribute.
STUDY 3
The aim of Study 3 was to replicate the results
from Studies 1 and 2, despite the fact that the
other key attribute, neighbouring gain, was made
prominent and that a new type of framing was
applied. This new type is often referred to as the
Asian disease design (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981),
and is generally considered to be the standard type
of framing. Participants choose between two
options, one offering a sure outcome and the
other a risky one. The frames are manipulated by
changing the salience of reference points such that
participants perceive formally identical outcomes
either as gains or as losses. However, as in Studies
1 and 2, it was assumed that the introduction of a
framing manipulation of the described type would
not have a negative impact on the prominence
effect. It was therefore assumed that H1b should
be supported in Study 3 and not distorted by this
manipulation of a context factor.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight undergraduate stu-
dents (24 men and 24 women), drawn from the
same populations as in the previous studies, were
paid SEK 50 to participate in the study.
Experimental design. The experimental design
was the same as the one that was used in Studies 1
and 2, with the difference that the nature of the
outcome was used as the context factor for the
alternatives. In one version the resource could be
framed as ‘‘50% likelihood for the community to
receive X amount of money from the government per
year and inhabitant for environmental protection
measures.’’ In the corresponding version to this
example, the resource would be framed as ‘‘100%
likelihood for the community to receive X/2 amount
of money to the community from the government per
year and inhabitant for environmental protection
measures.’’
Another difference from the preceding studies
was that in all tasks, neighbouring community
gain was manipulated as the prominent attribute
in the sense that participants were informed that
the neighbouring community was in need of (need
condition), or had deserved (equity condition),
priority over the own community.
Based on the balancing of gender and type of
student population, participants were assigned to
one of two experimental conditions (different
versions of manipulating the prominence effect).
The same scoring procedure of participants’
responses was used as in Studies 1 and 2.
Results and discussion
A 3 (response procedure: choice vs preference
ratings vs rank orders)62 (alternative: own
community vs joint community)62 (frame: risky
vs risk less) mixed ANOVA with repeated
measures on all factors was performed. The
analyses yielded the following effects: univariate
F(2, 47) 5 2.73, p 5 .08 for response mode; uni-
variate F(1, 47) 5 4.15, p , .05 for alternative;
Figure 2. Mean response scores in Study 2 by alternative and control condition.
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univariate F(1, 47) 5 61.20, p , .0001 for type of
frame.
H1b. As revealed in Figure 3, the prominence
effect was not supported in that the joint commu-
nity alternative generally was not more frequently
chosen or highly rated than the own community
alternative. Moreover, a main effect of type of
frame was observed but the factor did not interact
with alternative. Thus, it had no impact on the
prominence effect.
Manipulation check. The mean weight ratio
obtained from the pilot matching experiment
(n 5 36 ) was 1.28, indicating that neighbouring
community gain was perceived to be the promi-
nent attribute.
STUDY 4
A specific type of framing has been labelled mental
accounting (Thaler, 1980). It implies that people in
general write down each consequence in black ink
or red ink, depending on whether they count it as a
gain or loss with respect to some reference point.
The basic characteristic of this type of accounting
is that people use it in order to take shortcuts and
combine, for instance, two gains, or two losses, or
a gain and a loss, before writing them down
mentally (Baron, 1994). It was assumed that H1b
should be supported in Study 4.
The status quo effect represents one major form
of mental accounting. It implies that people tend
to stick to plans with which they are familiar. For
instance, it has been revealed by Samuelson and
Zeckhauser (1988) that employees hired before
1980 in an organization tended, 6 years later, to
stick with the plans they had originally chosen,
and that new plans were chosen mainly by new
employees, regardless of age of either group.
However, as in Studies 1, 2, and 3, it was assumed
that the introduction of a framing manipulation
would not have a negative impact on the
prominence effect.
Method
Participants. Another 48 undergraduate stu-
dents (24 men and 24 women), drawn from the
same populations as in the previous studies,
participated in the study and were paid SEK 50
for their participation.
Experimental design. The experimental design
was the same as the one in Study 3, with the
difference that the novelty of the situation was
used as the context factor for the alternatives.
In one version the resource was framed as ‘‘amount
of money currently distributed from the govern-
ment to the community per year and inhabitant since
one year for environmental protection measures.’’ In
the other version the resource was framed as
‘‘amount of money currently distributed from the
government to the community per year and inhabi-
tant since ten years for environmental protection
measures.’’
Based on the balancing of gender and type of
student population, participants were assigned to
one of two experimental conditions (different
versions of manipulating the prominence effect).
The same scoring procedure of participants’
responses was used as in the previous studies.
Results and discussion
A 3 (response procedure: choice vs preference
ratings vs rank orders) 6 2 (alternative: own
Figure 3. Mean response scores in Study 3 by alternative and control condition.
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community vs joint community) 6 2 (status quo:
present vs absent) mixed ANOVA with repeated
measures on all factors was performed. The
analyses yielded the following effects: univariate
F(2, 45) 5 0.015, p 5 .99 for response mode; uni-
variate F(1, 45) 5 38.31, p , .0001 for alternative;
univariate F(1, 45) 5 1.07, p 5 .31 for status quo.
H1b. As revealed by the reliable main effect for
alternative (see Figure 4 for an illustration), a
prominence effect was observed, in that the joint
community alternative generally was more fre-
quently chosen or highly rated than the own
community alternative.
Manipulation check. The mean weight ratio
obtained from the pilot matching experiment
(n 5 36) was 1.14, indicating that neighbouring
community gain was perceived to be the promi-
nent attribute.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results revealed that the manipulation of own
community gain as the prominent attribute in a
resource allocation situation led to biased prefer-
ences. Clearly, in these kind of situations people
tended to prefer alternatives that maximize the
gain of the own community in favour of alter-
natives that, for instance, maximize the joint gain
of the own and the neighbouring community (see
Bonaiuto et al., 2002; Fried, 2000; Giuliani, 2002,
for a discussion). On the other hand, making
neighbouring community gain prominent made
participants take into account both own commu-
nity gain and neighbouring community gain to a
higher extent. The underlying logic for this reason-
ing is that making one of the attributes
(own community gain) prominent in a resource
allocation decision would be equal to a strong
manipulation of in-group social identity.
The pro-self nature of the prominence effect
Based on the previous research, a prominence
effect was expected in that participants were
generally assumed to prefer a matched alternative
that maximized the own community gain to a
matched alternative that maximized the joint gain,
if ‘‘own community gain’’ was manipulated to be
the prominent attribute. The results obtained from
Studies 1 and 2 supported these predictions. It was
also assumed that participants would prefer an
alternative that maximized the joint gain of the
own community and a neighbouring community,
if ‘‘neighbouring community gain’’ was made the
prominent attribute. In this situation, participants
were not assumed to prefer a pro-other alternative
that maximized the gain of the neighbouring
community. The underlying reason was that it
was predicted that making an ‘‘other interest
attribute’’ prominent would not result to the same
extent in noncompensatory reasoning leading to
the prominence effect. Since participants in these
studies preferred an alternative that maximized the
joint gain of both communities, the results
obtained from Studies 3 and 4 also supported
these predictions. Taken together, the results from
all the four studies thus suggest that making the
gain of the neighbouring community prominent
de-biases the prominence effect to a higher extent
compared to making own community gain promi-
nent. Place identity may very well serve as an
important driver (Cuba & Hummon, 1993).
Hence, it may be argued that there seems to be
some kind of a pro-self component that explains
a large part of the variance observed for the
prominence effect. Some form of in-group
Figure 4. Mean response scores in Study 4 by alternative and control condition.
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favouritism may also serve as the driver for it
(Brewer, 1999, 2001; Otten & Mummendy, 2000).
A strength of the study was that these major
results appeared to be quite robust when consid-
ered as task effects, as the salience of the
manipulated context factors in the studies (in
terms of reliable main or interaction effects) did
not distort them.
The salience of equality as a competing force
It should be noted that the equality alternative was
not assumed to be the most preferred alternative to
such a high extent as it actually was. Whether the
preference for the equality alternative may be
interpreted as being driven by place identity or
resulting from some kind of shallow processing is a
question that remains to be answered. For
instance, Messick (1993) observed that the popu-
larity of the equality principle in many resource
allocation tasks may be explained by the fact that
it is quite easy to implement heuristically. Thus, an
important feature of this principle is that it is
quite simple to use. All the information one
needs is the number of share takers and then it
becomes quite easy to make a division and
calculate the per capita share. For this reason,
people use equality heuristically, that is, they do
not always think seriously and inquisitively about
their decision (Messick, 1993, 1995; Roch et al.,
2000).
Taking the results from all four studies into
account, an interpretation seems plausible in line
with Messick’s explanation of why people prefer
equality alternatives to such a high extent. After
all, the preference levels for the equality alternative
appeared rather independent on whether ‘‘own
community gain’’ or ‘‘neighbouring community
gain’’ was manipulated to be the prominent
dimension.
Limitations
The operationalization of the joint community
alternative was built on the fact that it has recently
been suggested that place identity may play a role
in resource dilemmas (e.g., Bonaiuto et al., 2002;
Fried, 2000; Giuliani, 2002). It was also built on
empirical findings suggesting that the notion of
place, in people’s general opinion, refers to any
combination of communities in a region (Cuba &
Hummon, 1993). Still, there seems to be a
disagreement between different camps of place
theorists in the sense that some of them state that
place identity is restricted to relationships between
humans and their physical environment whereas
others use the concept to encompass both social
and physical environments. For this reason, it is
difficult to draw any clear conclusions about how
the concept of place identity may have served as a
driver for the observed cooperative behaviour
(preference for the joint community alternative).
This is something that remains to be explored
more thoroughly.
Implications for future research
Future research in the area of contingent
weighting in judgment and choice will probably
focus more on social decision situations that
involve the maximization of gains for others too.
Research on how different biases may occur in
decision situations that do not include the
welfare of others has dominated up until now
(Baron, 1997, 1998; Loukopolis & Scholz, 2003,
for a practical example). Future field experi-
ments may, for instance, compare people who
have been residents in their own community for a
long time to people who recently have moved to a
new community. It may be the case that
such subgroups will have different cognitive
representations of what place identity means to
them.
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